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WISCONSIN
County of Sawyer Zoning Bd. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Workforce Dev.,
605 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that by failing to grant a
variance to property owner who infringed upon setback from creek, zoning
board did not discriminate and department lacked authority to order the
zoning board to grant the variance and dismiss the citation for a setback
violation).
Gregory Klint, suffering from a number of health problems, hired a
contractor to build an addition to his summer cabin on Grindstone Creek.
The addition increased the view and allowed him to keep his oxygen air
hose free of traffic and entanglement. Mr. Klint was considered disabled
for purposes of the Wisconsin Fair Housing Act ("WFHA"). A triangular
portion of the addition infringed upon the forty-foot average setback from
the high water mark of the creek.
The Sawyer County Zoning
administrator issued Klint two citations-one for building without a permit
and the other for violating the minimum setback as mandated by Sawyer
County's shoreland zoning ordinance. After the zoning board denied an
after-the-fact variance, Klint filed a disability discrimination complaint
against the zoning board under the WFHA. An administrative law judge
found the board in violation of the WFHA, ordered them to grant Klint a
variance and to dismiss the setback citation. The circuit court reversed the
Department of Workforce Development's ("Department") decision,*and the
Department appealed.
On appeal the court granted de novo review of the Department's
decision, rather than the circuit court's. The issue on appeal was whether
the Department, in enforcing the WFHA, may order the zoning board to
issue a shoreland variance based on Klint's disability. Examination of an
individual's personal characteristics would require a modification of the
shoreland zoning variance standard.
The court held that the zoning board did not discriminate, but applied
the correct legal standard when it refused to grant the variance, and the
Department lacked authority to order the zoning board to grant the variance
and dismiss the setback citation. The proper standard for granting a
shoreland setback zoning variance is whether the property owner has no
feasible use of the property without the variance, taking into account only
the peculiar characteristics of the land. The Department asserted that
under both the WFHA and another Wisconsin statute, Klint would suffer
an "unnecessary hardship" if a variance were not granted. The court
reasoned that "unnecessary hardship," as claimed by Klint, applies to the
conditions affecting the lot in question, not to conditions personal to the
landowner. Unnecessary hardship would have resulted if Klint had had no
reasonable use of the land without a variance, but feasible use was possible
without a variance in Klint's case.
The court refused to expand the Supreme Court's holdings to
encompass consideration of disability because it has proscribed examination
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of personal characteristics of the owner when considering shoreland
variances, and that would have required modification or overruling of
Supreme Court case law. The court also held that the legislative mandate,
statutory scheme, and compelling state interest, dictates that the supreme
court's prohibition against considering personal characteristics controls,
and the WFHA was inapplicable here. Because the setback requirements
do not single out Klint and do not impose requirements different from those
imposed on all others, the board had not discriminated against Klint.
The court concluded that the zoning board had not engaged in
discrimination and the Department lacked authority to order the board to
grant the variance and dismiss the citation for violating the setback.
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O-Ton-Kah Park v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 604
N.W.2d 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that easement holders with
riparian rights were not 'riparian owners' eligible for pier permits, and
statute allowing non-riparian owners to maintain a pier was inapplicable
because the pier did not meet the statutory requirements).
O-Ton-Kah Park ("Subdivision") was a subdivision near a lake that did
not contain any riparian property. The Subdivision, however, owned an
easement that allows its residents access to nearby Lake Beulah.
Subdivision wanted to construct a pier on the lake, but the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") denied Subdivision's permit
application.
After an administrative hearing and district court order
affirming the DNR's decision, Subdivision brought this appeal.
Subdivision claimed the DNR's decision was wrong for two reasons.
First, Subdivision claimed it had a right to construct a pier as a riparian
easement holder. Second, Subdivision claimed, in the alternative, that it
was allowed, by statute, to maintain the pier without a permit. The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals quickly dismissed each of Subdivision's
arguments.
Addressing Subdivision's first claim, the court held that it ran contrary
to clear statutory language. The court recognized that the statutes granted
"riparian owners" and "riparian proprietors" the right to construct piers,
but not "riparian easement holders." Finding the term "riparian owner"
well defined under Wisconsin law as "one who holds title to land abutting a
body of water," the court rejected Subdivision's argument that the term
was ambiguous. Thus, the court refused to include Subdivision, by virtue
of its easement, under the statutory provision pertaining to owners.
The court then turned to Subdivision's second argument. Subdivision
had alternatively argued that it fell under the statutory exception allowing
entities to maintain piers without permits. Focusing on the statutory text,
however, the court realized the exception only applied to piers that had
been placed seasonally in the same place at least once every four years
since the easement was recorded. Because Subdivision's easement had

